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jyRIgPICTIQNAL STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, on Dec-
ember 19, 1990, Judge J. Thomas Greene, Jr., United States District 
Judge for the District of Utah, certified certain questions to 
this Court which the Court accepted by Order of December 21, 1990• 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The specific issues certified by Judge Greene are: 
1. Whether Utah adopts the "unavoidably unsafe 
products" exception to strict products liability as set 
forth in Comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (1965). 
Subquestion A: If Utah does adopt Comment k, should 
FDA approved prescription drugs be deemed as a matter of 
law to have satisfied the "unavoidably unsafe" pre-
requisite to the Comment k exception, or should that 
determination be made on a case by case basis? 
Subquestion B; If Utah does adopt Comment k, and 
if it is further determined that its application to FDA 
approved prescription drugs ought to be made on a case 
by case basis, is such determination a threshold question 
for the trial court, or a question properly to be pre-
sented to the jury? 
Subquestion C: If it is determined that Comment k 
is to be applied to FDA approved prescription drugs on a 
case by case basis, is evidence pertaining to adverse 
side-effects from the drug which are not alleged to have 
been personally suffered by the plaintiff relevant to 
the "unavoidably unsafe" determination? 
These questions present controlling but as yet unanswered issues 
of law for original disposition by the Court. No decision is being 
reviewed and therefore there is no applicable standard of review. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Question 1 asks this Court whether Comment k to Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 402A is the law of Utah. It states: 
iLt. Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some 
products which, in the present state of human knowledge, 
are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the 
field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine 
for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly 
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it 
is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads 
to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the 
vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoid-
able high degree of risk which they involve. Such a 
product, properly prepared, accompanied by proper direc-
tions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unrea-
sonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, 
vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason 
cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the 
prescription of a physician. It is also true in parti-
cular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, 
because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient 
medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, 
or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experi-
ence as there is justifies the marketing and use of the 
drug notwithstanding the medically recognizable risk. 
The seller of such products, again with the qualification 
that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper 
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is 
not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate conse-
quences attending their use, merely because he has under-
taken to supply the public with an apparently useful and 
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently 
reasonable risk. 
Non-case and non-statutory references which the Court will find 
useful in resolving the Certified Questions, but which are not 
themselves determinative of a particular issue, are filed for the 
Court's convenience in a separately bound Appendix. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE QF THE CASE 
This lawsuit is brought by plaintiff Ilo Marie Grundberg 
individually and by plaintiff Janice Gray as personal representative 
of the estate of Mildred Coats. On June 19, 1988, Mrs. Grundberg 
fired nine shots from a revolver-action handgun at her mother, 
Mrs. Coats. Mrs. Coats died from the wounds inflicted by the eight 
rounds which struck her. Mrs. Grundberg sued Upjohn, alleging 
that Halcion caused her to shoot her mother. 
2 -
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Plaintiffs filed suit against Upjohn on March 24, 1989, 
alleging a variety of theories. A number of Counts have been dis-
missed and/or Upjohn has been granted summary judgment thereon, 
as Upjohn has attempted to narrow the issues for the trial. Plain-
tiffs1 remaining liability theories include negligence and strict 
liability. Plaintiffs allege that Upjohn failed to adequately 
warn about certain adverse side effects of Halcion, and that Halcion 
was defectively designed. The failure to warn claims will go to 
trial on April 29, 1991, regardless how the Court answers the 
questions certified to it. The strict liability in tort theory of 
liability is the subject of a pending summary judgment motion. 
Whether the trial court will apply strict liability in tort depends 
on this Courtfs resolution of the Certified Questions. 
It is agreed that the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A, Comment k (1965), and the principles it embodies, provide 
an exemption from strict liability for a claimed design defect in 
the case of products which are "unavoidably unsafe". Upjohn argued 
in its pending summary judgment motion that public policy supporting 
the research and development of new drugs requires a holding that 
all FDA-approved prescription medications are "unavoidably unsafe 
products" under Comment k. Plaintiffs argued that every lawsuit 
alleging injury due to Halcion should be permitted to redetermine 
whether Halcion is unavoidably unsafe and, in essence, whether the 
FDA properly determined that it should be marketed because its bene-
fits exceeded its risks. The District Court found that this issue 
is a controlling question of law and certified it to this Court. 
3 -
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B. STATEMENT OF FACTS* 
1. Facts Leading Up to the Killing 
In May, 1987, Mrs. Grundberg and her mother Mrs. Coats 
lived in separate mobile homes in Chino Valley, Arizona. (Depo. 
of Ilo Grundberg, at 297). Mrs. Grundberg was at that time taking 
a variety of medications prescribed by her physicians to relieve 
symptoms of what had been diagnosed as chronic depression and anx-
iety. (Master Med. Records, mem 020; Depo. of Quentin Regestein, 
Ex. 8). These drugs included anti-depressants, anti-anxiety agents 
and sleeping medications. (Regestein Depo. at Ex. 8). The record 
suggests that Mrs. Grundberg took Valium consistently for nearly 
17 years. (Master Med. Records, win 081). 
Halcion was first prescribed for Mrs. Grundberg on May 
21, 1987. (Grundberg Depo. at 351). Mrs. Grundberg lost her job 
in December, 1987. (Id. at 99-100). Shortly thereafter, Mrs. 
Grundberg moved her mother to Hurricane, Utah, where they lived 
together in a mobile home. fid, at 378). In Hurricane, Mrs. Grund-
berg could find no job and her monthly bills exceeded her income, 
fid, at 382-84; Plaintiffs1 Response to Fourth Request to Produce 
1. This Statement of Facts is taken in part from the statement 
included in Judge Greenefs Certification Order. Judge Greene 
recognized that the parties might want to supplement the minimal 
record he certified and indicated that the parties could do so if 
they desired. Upjohn has therefore added a minimum of additional 
relevant facts about Mrs. Grundbergfs psychological history and 
her use of Halcion and other medications so that the Court will be 
able to put the certified questions in a factual and medical 
context. Relevant pages of the depositions and other documents 
supporting these facts are contained in the Appendix filed herewith. 
The Appendix also includes copies of excerpts of certain expert 
depositions as well as excerpts of medical articles and books, FDA 
and Congressional transcripts and reports, and other published 
materials cited in this brief but not readily available. 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Documents, Exhibit B). In May 1988, Mrs. Grundberg was seen at an 
emergency room where laboratory values demonstrated elevated 
parathyroid hormone levels and calcium levels indicative of a 
condition known as hyperparathyroidism, which can mimic psychiatric 
conditions, including aggression. (Depo. of Steven Van Norman, at 
19-20; Depo. of Richard Shanteau, at 123-24). 
In 1987, Mrs. Grundberg was told that her mother was 
suffering from Alzheimer^ disease (Depo. of Dr. Albert Caccavale, 
at 169-70). In March, 1988, Mrs. Grundberg attempted unsuccessfully 
to obtain financing to place her mother into a nursing home. 
(Master Non-Med. Records, med. 003, 004, 006, 010). On repeated 
and varied occasions in May and June 1988, Mrs. Coats expressed 
her desire not to be a burden (Master Non-Med. Records, pgm 027-
28); that she was ready to die (Master Med. Records, ush 148, 160); 
and that she wanted to be with her deceased husband (Master Med. 
Records, sha 376-79, 379-A, 380, 381, 383). 
On June 19, 1989 Mrs. Grundberg took three medications: 
Valium, an opiate (codeine), and Halcion (Grundberg Depo. at 523, 
537). That night, within one half hour of her mother's 83rd birth-
day, Mrs. Grundberg shot at her mother five times, reloaded and 
shot at her four additional times. A recorded statement was taken 
of Mrs. Grundberg after the killing as to the reasons she killed 
her mother (Depo. of Lynn Excell at 17). Mrs. Grundberg was then 
arrested and was again interviewed the next morning. (Master Set 
of Non-Med. Records, pgm 0001-033). While in jail, Mrs. Grundberg 
continued to take Halcion (Ifl. at wsc 0006). In the criminal action 
that ensued, court-appointed "alienists" opined that Mrs. Grundberg 
- 5 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
knew what she was doing and intended to kill her mother and that 
she had the requisite state of mind to be found guilty of man-
slaughter (Master Set of Med. Records, how 002-003; gro 013-014). 
Nonetheless, the Washington County Prosecutor dropped all criminal 
charges and within six weeks, plaintiffs filed this civil action. 
2. FDA Approval of Halcion 
Halcion is the trade name for triazolam, a prescription 
medication indicated for the short term management of insomnia. 
It is one of a particular class of sedating drugs called benzodiaze-
pines. Benzodiazepines represent a significant advance in safety 
and efficacy over the older sleeping medications, such as the bar-
biturates. James Cooper, Sedative Hypnotic Drugs: Risks and Bene-
fits, National Institute Drug Abuse, pp. 104-05 (1977). 
Halcion was the subject of an extensive program of clini-
cal testing beginning with the filing of an Investigational New 
Drug Exemption (IND) for Halcion with the United States Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) in September 1970. (See Letter Dated 
Sept. 10, 1970.) On May 4, 1976, Upjohn submitted a New Drug Ap-
plication (NDA) with the FDA, seeking approval to market Halcion 
in the United States. (See Letter Dated May 4, 1976.) 
Over a more than six-year period the FDA conducted a 
review of both the clinical testing of Halcion and post-marketing 
experience in European countries where it already had been approved 
since as early as 1977 (Depo. of Otto Kruezer at 189). As those 
studies demonstrated, Halcion has a relatively short half-life, 
that is, it is rapidly eliminated from the system. This means 
that it does not typically cause side effects such as next day 
- 6 
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sedation, which is often seen with longer half-life sleeping pills. 
(1977 FDA Advisory Committee Tr. at 311-12). This is particularly 
important for people with trouble sleeping for whom daytime alert-
ness is necessary for job performance or driving safety. 
In November 1982, the FDA concluded that Halcion is safe 
and effective when prescribed and used according to the product 
labeling and approved its marketing in the United States under its 
then current product labeling, including warnings and instructions 
for the prescribing physician. (See FDA Letter Dated Nov. 15, 
1982.) Halcion has since become the most widely prescribed 
benzodiazepine sleeping medication in the world. It has now been 
approved by regulatory agencies in nearly 80 countries. (Depo. of 
Otto Kruezer at 218) Halcion, including its current warnings and 
instructions for use directed to the prescribing physician, is 
still fully approved by the FDA in doses up to 0.5 mg.; it has 
never been recalled or its approval revoked by the FDA. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Judge Greene has asked this Court to determine whether 
Utah will adopt the nearly universally recognized exception to 
strict liability for "unavoidably unsafe products11 set forth in 
Comment k to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, and whether the 
Court will apply Comment k to all FDA-approved prescription 
medications. If this Court determines that prescription drugs are 
entitled to an exemption from the application of strict liability 
in tort, Judge Greene has asked three subguestions concerning the 
application of that theory. 
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Judge Greene notes that many courts hold that the policy 
behind the "unavoidably unsafe product" exception requires that 
the exception apply to all prescription drugs. These courts recog-
nize that imposition of strict liability for design defect on pre-
scription drugs would result in overdeterrence by hindering the 
development of new and socially useful drugs. They hold that public 
policy is best met by judging whether the prescription manufacturer 
adequately warned of the drug's risks. 
Certain other courts, Judge Greene notes, apply the 
unavoidably unsafe product exception to prescription drugs on a 
case-by-case basis. These courts reexamine in a "mini-trial" in 
every lawsuit whether the risks of a particular prescription medi-
cation were unavoidable at the time of distribution and whether 
its benefits appeared to exceed its risks at that time. If not, 
the judge or jury will be allowed to determine in any particular 
case that the drug was defectively designed and should not have been 
marketed. Subquestion A asks which approach Utah will follow. 
Upjohn submits that this Court should adopt Comment k 
and apply it to all FDA-approved prescription drugs. The case-by-
case alternative is fraught with dangers and contravenes serious 
public policy goals. It would improperly - and unwisely - require 
a lay trier of fact to second-guess the United States Food and 
Drug Administration's decision that a particular drug should be 
available for physicians' use in treating patients. An individual 
suit is not an appropriate forum for such a social policy decision; 
it is simply not a lay factfinder's role to determine the desira-
bility of making a drug available to the public-at-large. 
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Application of Comment k to all FDA-approved prescription 
drugs will properly limit the issues in this civil suit to whether 
plaintiff is entitled to recover because defendant negligently 
failed to warn her physician about the risks of use of the 
prescription drug Halcion. The answer to Subquestion A should 
thus be that under Utah law FDA-approved drugs will "be deemed as 
a matter of law to have satisfied the 'unavoidably unsafe1 
prerequisite to the Comment k exception." 
This Court need not reach Judge Greene's Subguestions B 
and C, as the former concerns whether the judge or the jury should 
determine the applicability of Comment k on a case-by-case basis, 
while the latter concerns the scope of the evidence the chosen 
decision maker will consider. These questions are irrelevant if 
this Court applies Comment k to all prescription drugs. 
In the event this Court were to adopt a case-by-case 
approach, however, Upjohn submits that the applicability of Comment 
k must necessarily be determined by the court rather than by the 
jury. The issue is one of policy - whether the FDA properly made 
a particular prescription drug available for physicians to use in 
treating persons such as plaintiff. The FDA made that determination 
in the first instance in reviewing hundreds of volumes of data and 
hundreds of clinical studies involving thousands of patients, in 
deciding to approve the New Drug Application (NDA) to market Halcion 
in 1982 and in continuing to permit Halcion to be available as a 
useful and desirable part of the physician's arsenal. 
Moreover, the FDA issues its approval of an NDA knowing 
that the drug will be available only through the prescription of a 
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learned intermediary — the physician. Any concerns the FDA has 
about use of the product in particular types of patients or situa-
tions are allayed by placing FDA-approved prescribing information 
in the drug's package insert. These inserts inform the physician 
how and when he may prescribe the medication. He uses this infor-
mation, his general medical knowledge, and his familiarity with 
the patient, in deciding what medications, if any, to use in 
treating a particular patient. This reliance on the physician as 
the learned intermediary distinguishes prescription medications from 
other products, which are designed with the knowledge that it will 
be the consumer who must read and follow the warnings. 
If yet a third level of review is to be required, it 
should be review by a court, and even a court is ill-equipped to 
decide the Comment k issue, for it will not be decided based on 
the type of evidence a court usually considers. To allow trial 
courts to determine whether a product is unavoidably unsafe would, 
in effect, usurp the function of the Food and Drug Administration 
and allow trial courts to make a decision about the societal value 
of Halcion, rather than its value to plaintiff. The court would be 
functioning as a quasi-regulatory body. As Utah courts have 
repeatedly recognized, regulatory authority is best exercised by 
the appropriate regulatory agency, not by the courts. 
In any event, such policy decisions should certainly not 
be made by a jury. The jury would have to compare Halcion to other 
available prescription medications, without having available to it 
most of the data about other drugs and their relative risks and 
benefits. Moreover, a jury simply is not likely to understand 
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many of the scientific issues involved, and would be overwhelmed 
by the vast amount of evidence about Halcion to be reviewed. 
The jury in the underlying action would also be 
unavoidably and irreparably prejudiced by consideration of volumes 
of data relevant only to the Comment k question. Much of this 
evidence would be unduly prejudicial such that it should not be 
heard by the jury in the underlying action. Moreover, the mere 
attempt to separate out admissible from inadmissible evidence would 
itself be a nightmare, for either court or jury. The issue is 
properly one for the FDA to determine as a policy matter. Comment 
k should apply to all prescription drugs. 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT COMMENT KfS "UNAVOIDABLY 
UNSAFE PRODUCT" EXCEPTION TO STRICT LIABILITY 
Considerations of public policy have led every state to 
consider the issue to adopt the "unavoidably unsafe product" excep-
tion to strict liability either by expressly adopting Comment k 
or by adopting a similar common law rule. As Judge Greene noted in 
Patten v. Lederle Labs., 676 F. Supp. 233 (D. Utah 1987), even 
those cases on which plaintiffs rely recognize and apply Comment k 
to products they find to be unavoidably unsafe.2 
The uniform adoption of the "unavoidably unsafe product" 
exception to strict liability is due to the universality of the 
public policy principles it embodies: manufacturers of products 
which are properly prepared and marketed with adequate warnings of 
2. See cases cited in Patten. 676 F. Supp. at 235 n.5. This 
makes sense, for before deciding to apply Comment k on a case-by-
case basis, a court must first adopt it. See also, cases cited 
infra, n. 39 applying Comment k to all prescription drugs. 
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knowable dangers should not be held liable for having marketed a 
defectively designed product simply because the product necessarily 
and unavoidably poses some risks of harm. The text of Comment k is 
set forth in the Determinative Rules Section, supra at 1-2. 
Courts also universally recognize that the "unavoidably 
unsafe product11 exception has special application to prescription 
drugs, as they necessarily - unavoidably - entail some risk of 
harm; that is why they are only available by prescription in the 
first instance. Thus, Dean Prosser, the Reporter for Restatement 
§ 402A, has summed up what is sometimes called the prescription 
drug exemption from strict liability as follows: 
The argument that industries producing potentially dang-
erous products should make good the harm, distribute it 
by liability insurance, and add the cost to the price 
of the product, encounters reason for pause when we con-
sider that two of the greatest medical boons to the human 
race, penicillin and cortisone, both have their dangerous 
side effects, and that drug companies might well have 
been deterred from providing and selling them. 
Prosser, Torts § 99, at 161 (4th ed. 1971).3 Dr. Kales, one of 
plaintiffs1 experts, has specifically stated that medication should 
be one component of the treatment of insomnia. He cites surveys 
3. Of course, where Comment k applies, plaintiffs may still 
proceed on a failure to warn theory under Comment j to § 402A. 
Comment j defines what constitutes an "adequate warning": 
[T]he seller is required to give warning against it, 
[dangerous ingredients] if he has knowledge, or by the 
application of reasonable, developed human skill and 
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the 
ingredient and the danger. 
§ 402A Comment j. Read together, these comments provide that a 
manufacturer is not strictly liable for injuries caused by a 
prescription drug so long as the drug was properly prepared and 
accompanied by warnings of its risks that were either known or 
reasonably scientifically knowable at the time of ingestion. 
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showing 13% of the population often have trouble sleeping, and 
states chronic insomnia can be characterized as a major disability 
and as a prevalent symptom of medical and psychiatric disorders. 
"When longstanding and severe, this symptom profoundly affects 
patients1 lives and becomes the central focus of distress."4 
Utah has adopted § 402A, Hahn. Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 
601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979), has applied other comments to § 402A 
when called upon to do so, and routinely follows comments to other 
Restatement sections. None of the cases plaintiffs cite dispute the 
validity of Comment k itself or of the principles it embodies. 
In fact, Utah and other states have adopted the "learned inter-
mediary doctrine." That doctrine requires that warnings of risks 
of use of a prescription drug be provided to the physician, who 
will act as a learned intermediary in determining whether to pre-
scribe that particular drug for a particular patient. Barson v. 
E.R. Squibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1984). In light 
of this established law, plaintiffs withdrew their claim that Upjohn 
had a duty to warn plaintiffs directly. See Addendum at 9, n.4. 
For these reasons, and because of the policy reasons 
behind Comment k, and the universal adoption of that comment by 
the courts, Judge Greene has predicted that Utah would adopt Comment 
k also. See Patten. 676 F.2d at 235 & nn. 3, 4. Upjohn requests 
this Court to adopt Comment k and its underlying policy rationales. 
4. Kales, et al., "Biopsychobehavioral Correlates of Insomnia," 
Am. J. Psych. 141:1371 (1984). £££ sl£2 Kales, et al., "Insomnia, 
The Scope of the Problem," Eval. & Treatment of Insomnia at 37-38, 
48 (1984); Kales, et al., "Treatment of Sleep Disorders," 4 
Psychiatric Disorders at 210. 
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Upjohn further suggests, as discussed below, that under these poli-
cies Comment k should apply to all prescription drugs. 
II. THE COMMENT K EXCEPTION FOR "UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE 
PRODUCTS" SHOULD BE APPLIED TO ALL PRESCRIPTION 
DRUGS FOR VITAL REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 
The key issue for the Court's decision is really a narrow 
one. Plaintiffs argue - and certain cases suggest - that Com-
ment kfs principles can be effectuated in the instance of prescrip-
tion drugs if the application of Comment Jc to that drug is redeter-
mined in each lawsuit. For instance, plaintiffs would prefer that 
every time a plaintiff sues Upjohn alleging Halcion is defective, 
plaintiff1s case would not be limited to proving that Upjohn1s 
conduct in marketing Halcion as to that particular plaintiff was 
wrongful. Rather, plaintiff would also request the Court to 
redetermine the general social policy issue of whether Halcion 
should in general be found to be unavoidably unsafe and so to 
"qualify" for Comment k. According to the cases plaintiffs cited 
below, this would require a redetermination in each case of whether 
alternatives to Halcion exist which are "better11 for patients in 
general, whether the risks of Halcion in general exceed its 
benefits, and perhaps even whether "society" needs Halcion. See. 
e.g.. Kearl v. Lederle Labs, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 
453 (1985). 
If Halcion passes these tests in a particular case, then 
strict liability for design defect will not be tried or submitted 
in that case. However, the next plaintiff, and the next, and the 
next, can again reexamine the basic decision of the FDA to make the 
prescription medication Halcion available, with adequate warnings, 
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for use by physicians by finding that Halcion is defectively 
designed and thus should not have been marketed. 
Upjohn submits that a case-by-case redetermination of 
the risk-benefit issue not only is inconsistent with the goals 
which underlie Comment k, but indeed will undermine those goals. 
Moreover, it is simply bad public policy. The reasons for this 
are simple: Prescription medications are unlike other products in 
at least two basic, and vital, respects. First, prescription medi-
cations cannot be made completely safe; they will always pose some 
risks of side effects. Despite these risks, and in contrast to 
any other product, society has determined that prescription medica-
tions provide a unique benefit to society and should be available 
to physicians with appropriate warnings. An elaborate regulatory 
system, overseen by the FDA, thus has been set up to control the 
approval and distribution of these drugs, and they are made avail-
able only through learned intermediaries. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 
et seq. No other product receives such special restrictions or 
protections in our society. An individual plaintiff should not be 
permitted to upset the delicate balance thus maintained. 
Second, the context of an individual lawsuit does not 
provide an adequate or appropriate forum for reexamination of the 
adequacy of a prescription drug's design, for that design must be 
examined in light of the public policy concerns and competing policy 
needs discussed above, not in light of the needs of an individual 
plaintiff. Yet, a lawsuit is designed to determine the rights of 
an individual plaintiff, not the social desirability of a particular 
drug therapy. The latter is a regulatory matter, and should be 
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left to regulators, not courts. To require a reexamination of 
this issue on a case-by-case basis will discourage development of 
new drugs, contrary to important public policies of our society. 
A. All Prescription Drugs Entail Some Risk Yet Society 
Encourages Their Development 
By their nature, all prescription drugs entail risks, 
so that no scientist, physician, researcher, regulatory body, jury, 
court or pharmaceutical company can ever say with absolute assurance 
that a prescription drug will never produce harmful effects in any 
people who use it.5 Indeed, the FDA has recognized that every 
"drug — even aspirin — presents some risks. If •safety1 were 
defined to mean absence of any risk, then no drug could be 
approved.11 Dept. of HEW, Section-By-Section Analysis, Drug Regul. 
Reform Act of 1978 (1978). Congress, too, is well aware "all drugs 
have serious potential side effects and all drugs are capable of 
serious harm if misused or abused. Therefore, safety is relative 
and both patients and regulators must assume some risk."6 
5. See, e.g., Gaston v. Hunter. 588 P.2d 326, 341-342 (Ariz. 
App. 1978) ; Urquhart & Heilmann, Risk Watch. The Odds Of Life, 
117-119 Facts on File Publications 1984; Goodman & Gilman, The 
Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics. 24, 25, 30 (4th ed. 1970); 
Wardell, Therapeutic Implications of the Drug Lag. 15 Clin. Pharm. 
& Therapeutics, 90, 91 (1974) (toxicity and efficacy testing can 
never guarantee a drug's safety in population at large); Comment, 
Can a Prescription Drug be Defectively Designed? — Brochu v. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp.. 31 DePaul L. Rev. 247, 250-251 & n.13 (1981) 
(even the most stringent testing procedures cannot eliminate dangers 
in otherwise useful drugs); Gilman & Goodman, The Pharmacological 
Basis Of Therapeutics 77 (8th ed. 1990) (,fany drug . . . has the 
potential to do harm11). 
6. Subcomm on Sci, Research & Tech of the House Comm on Sci & 
Tech, The Food & Drug AdjnjiugtraUon's process For Apprpvjnq New 
Drugs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess 51 (Comm Print 1980). 
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Although there can thus be no guarantee that any prescrip-
tion drug will not cause unforeseeable or unanticipated reactions, 
new pharmaceuticals are continually approved by the FDA because of 
their social benefit in saving lives and alleviating human suffer-
ing. As Richard Schweiker, former chief of the Department of Health 
& Human Services, succinctly points out: 
Imagine what our health care system would be like 
if we did not have antibiotics or any number of other 
drug products that enable us to quickly recover from 
diseases that once were debilitating or even fatal.7 
Moreover, particularly since the expansion of tort law is 
justified primarily on the basis of deterring or transferring the 
cost of injuries, it is appropriate to also consider the increased 
costs which would result if production of prescription drugs were 
deterred: 
In considering a research agenda for evaluating 
public policy toward pharmaceuticals, one fact should be 
kept stage center, drugs are our most cost-effective 
input in supplying the demand for health. A ten-dollar 
prescription is frequently a substitute for $2,000 worth 
of hospital services — a substitute that produces a 
positive outcome with much higher frequency than hospital 
care . . . . Our progress in the past in producing drug 
substitutes for [medical] procedures • . • indicate[s] 
that pharmaceutical innovations could contain the cost 
explosion in the health industry. If we are serious 
about minimizing costs, our best bet is to increase the 
number of drug innovations. [Emphasis added] 
Brozen, Statements, Drugs & Health 305 (Helms ed. 1981)• 
7. 37 Food, Drug & Cosmetic L. J. 15 (1982). In fact/ 
pharmaceuticals are "among the most vital causes for this century's 
dramatic increase in the length and quality of life." Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Cong. Rec. S 
10504 (Aug. 10, 1984) (remarks of Senator Hatch). Accord, 
Schwartzman, The Expected Return from Pharmaceutical Research: 
Sources of New Drugs and the Profitability of R & D Investment, 1-
7 (1975); Comment, Products Liability: The Continued Viability of 
the Learned Intermediary Rule as It Applies to Product Warnings for 
Prescription Drugs. 20 U. Rich. L. Rev. 405, 408 (1986). 
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At every stage of the drug research and development pro-
cess, a balance therefore must be struck between unavoidable risks 
and health-care benefits. That balance is struck in the first 
instance by the manufacturer. The balance is subject to careful 
scrutiny and c[£ novo determination by the FDA, and is then indivi-
dualized for each patient by the prescribing physician. Private 
investment decisions totalling billions of dollars annually and 
directly affecting the quality and cost of health care in this 
nation rest on how this balance is struck. Ultimately: 
The FDA*s approval certifies that an unbiased expert 
regulatory body has concluded that these risks are out-
weighed by the drug's therapeutic benefit and, thus, 
represents society's judgment that a particular drug 
should be marketed. 
Kuhlig & Kingham, Effect of Standardless Punitive Damage Awards. 
45 Food, Drug, Cosmetic L. J. 693, 696 (Nov. 1990) 
The Board of Trustees of the American Medical Association 
recently reported concern that the liberalization of product 
liability rules is already Hhaving a profound negative impact on 
the development of new medical technologies.ft8 < 
Basic biomedical research is deteriorating in certain 
fields because product liability inhibits utilizing that 
research to develop new medical products. Small companies 
involved in innovative research, such as many of the 
biotechnology firms, are delaying or foregoing certain < 
product releases because of inability to obtain adequate 
insurance coverage. 
Id. An FDA Expert Advisory Panel,9 the American Academy of Pedia-
8. A.M.A., Rot of Bd. of Trustees on Impact of Product Liability 
on the Devel. of New Medical Technologies 12 (1988). 
9. FDA, Biological Products; Bacterial Vaccines and Toxoids? 
Implementation of Efficacy Review. 50 Fed. Reg. 51,002, 51,006 
(1985) ("attempts to improve vaccines further will be hampered" 
(continued...) 
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tries,10 the Institute of Medicine,11 and commentators12 agree that 
liability concerns continue to impede pharmaceutical research and 
development. They have also forced removal of many useful and 
desirable products from the market. See infra. IIIB. 
This alarming disincentive for research would only be 
exacerbated by a decision of this Court to follow a case-by-case 
approach to Comment k. New drugs are developed almost exclusively 
by research intensive companies engaged in the discovery and devel-
opment of pharmaceuticals. This substantial private research effort 
is the source of virtually all new drugs in the United States. 
The cost of bringing a single new drug to market has been estimated 
at up to $85 million.13 In addition, pharmaceutical firms bear 
significant business risks during the development process. Only 
one of every 10,000 tested chemical compounds ultimately is 
9.(...continued) 
by tort liability) (report of the Advisory Panel on Review of 
Bacterial Vaccines and Toxoids). 
10. Vaccine Injury Compensation; Hearing Before the Subcommittee 
on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1986) (Statement of Martin 
Smith, President, American Academy of Pediatricians) ("research 
efforts for new and improved vaccines have been chilled" because 
of liability concerns). 
11. Inst, of Medicine, Vaccine Supply and Innovation 11 (1984) 
("apprehensions are a disincentive to investment in the development 
of new (or improved) immunizing agents9*). 
12. P. Huber, Liability; The Legal Revol. and Its Conseq. (1988). 
13. See Cohn, The Beginnings: Laboratory and Animal Studies. New 
Drug Development 9; Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human 
Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1984). 
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approved.14 If that approval is itself to be second-guessed, little 
incentive for development of new drugs remains. 
B. As A Prescription Drug Cannot Be Redesigned, A 
Decision That It Is Defectively Designed Is A 
Decision That It Should Not Be Marketed 
The second basic difference between prescription drugs 
and other products is that a prescription drug's "design" cannot 
be analyzed in light of the risks and the benefits it offers a 
particular plaintiff. Rather, for the policy reasons discussed 
above, these risks and benefits must be analyzed in light of the 
drug's value to society as a whole. This contrasts with a suit 
involving other products, such as an industrial machine. In the 
latter case, the factfinder will consider whether the manufacturer 
could have moved a pinch point, added a safety guard or otherwise 
redesigned the product to avoid a particular injury. By contrast, 
prescription drugs such as Halcion are not truly "designed" at 
all, and thus cannot be "redesigned" to add safety. 
A prescription drugfs active ingredients produce their 
beneficial effect because of their chemical configuration, which 
is a scientific constant. It cannot be changed without creating 
an entirely different drug. The new drug may have similar, but 
varying benefits, but it will also have new risks (which again 
cannot be altered without creating yet a third product) and it 
would have to undergo a completely separate process of FDA approval. 
Thus, if a court were allowed to find that Halcion were 
defectively designed, it would be saying that Halcion, qua Halcion, 
14. See Innovation and Patent Law Reform:; Hrinas Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties. and the Admin, of Justice of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary. 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1206 (1984). 
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should not have been marketed - instead, some other similar drug, 
or perhaps no drug at all, should have been produced. The court 
could not just make this decision based on the alleged injury to 
plaintiff, however, for physician's use prescription drugs in treat-
ing a variety of patients in a wide variety of clinical settings. 
A drug could be useless, or harmful, for one patient and yet essen-
tial for the proper care and treatment of another. 
1. The Social Utility Of Prescription Drugs Should Be 
Determined By The Appropriate Regulatory Agencies, 
Not By Individual Courts And Juries 
Upjohn submits that a determination of the desirability 
of making a particular medical product available to physicians is 
simply not within either the purposes to be served in the trial of 
an individual case, nor is it realistic to expect a judge or jury 
to even have the fair ability to make such a determination. Whether 
certain prescription drugs should be available in the United States 
is a regulatory issue, for the legislature and the executive branch 
(through the FDA) to determine as a matter of societal policy. It 
is not a matter for the courts except insofar as they review whether 
appropriate administrative procedures were followed. 
Utah courts have repeatedly recognized that "due to the 
important concept of separation of powers in our government, the 
courts should defer to the prerogative of the legislature to make 
the laws, and confine their own actions to interpreting and applying 
them." Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012, 
rev'd on other grounds. 421 U.S. 7 (1974). This is because: 
Inherent in the tripartite allocation of govern-
mental powers is the historical and pragmatic conviction 
that particular disputes are most amenable to resolution 
in particular forums. The requirement that a plaintiff 
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have a personal stake in the outcome of a dispute is 
intended . . . to limit the jurisdiction of the courts 
to those disputes which are most efficiently and effec-
tively resolved through the judicial process. 
Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983). In this regard, 
"courts are most competent in the exercise of their function when 
they have a •concrete factual context conducive to a realistic 
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.1w Id. 
In determining whether the FDA properly approved a pre-
scription drug, a court must go outside a concrete factual context 
and make a decision on matters of social policy - whether a drug 
should be in the physician's arsenal with which to fight illness. 
Utah recognizes that social policy decisions such as this should 
not be made by a court, however, but rather in Ma forum where free 
wheeling debate on broad issues of public policy is in order.91 
Id. at 1150. Accord, Stanton. 517 P.2d at 1013 (policy issues are 
best decided by the legislature as it engages in public scrutiny 
and debate whereas courts decide issues based on "a controversy 
between private individuals"). 
For these very reasons, in reviewing administrative agency 
decisions, this Court has accorded great deference to decisions 
based on factfinding or on mixed questions of law and fact, Williams 
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tele. Co.. 763 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 
1988) • It has also been recognized by Utah courts that: 
Deference, always due by appellate courts to fact-
finders, is maximized where, as here, the Legislature 
has comprehensively delegated responsibility over a par-
ticular subject to a specieqUgfl administrative agency-
- 22 -
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Wllburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 582, 586 (Utah App. 1988) 
(emphasis added) • Even on less complicated issues such as can be 
involved in workmen's compensation claims, it has been recognized: 
that the Commission should be accorded considerable lati-
tude in making determinations . . . [because] [i]n working 
with many such claims the Commission no doubt has devel-
oped a 'feel1 for such cases that escapes a court that 
deals with them only occasionally. 
Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 776 P.2d 639# 643 (Utah 
App. 1989) • Certainly in the case of complex issues comprehensively 
delegated to a specialized agency, Utah courts would display great 
deference to the agency's "feel* for such matters. 
In this case, a recognized, specialized and well-respected 
public agency exists which has been comprehensively delegated auth-
ority over prescription drugs and which is uniquely qualified to 
develop a "feel" for whether, as a policy matter, a prescription 
medication - such as Halcion - should be available to physicians. 
That body is the FDA. If jurisdictional considerations permitted 
appeal to this Court of the FDA's approval of Halcionvs marketing, 
this Court's cases would require it to defer to the FDA if it fol-
lowed proper administrative procedures in reaching its decision. 
It is absurd to suggest, as plaintiffs do, that individual trial 
courts or juries should nonetheless be permitted to engage in de 
novo reviews of the relevant evidence and second (and third and 
fourth) guess the FDA's policy decision to make Halcion available. 
2. The FDA Is Given The Authority To Regulate The 
Approval For Marketing Of Prescription Drugs 
Congress created the FDA as a means "designed primarily 
to protect consumers from dangerous products," United States v. 
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Sullivan. 332 U.S. 689, 696 (1948), by providing uniform federal 
regulation of prescription drugs. Congress thus established a: 
system of premarket approval for new drugs to ensure 
they are safe and effective. Under this system, the 
FDA, with the advice of outside medical authorities, 
regulates the premarket testing of new drugs, the approval 
process, drug manufacturing, labeling and advertising, 
and post-approval reporting of adverse events. 
Kuhlig & Kingham, 45 Food, Drug & Cosmetic L. J. at 694; 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 351-55; 21 C.F.R. parts 200-299, 312, 314. As stated by the 
Acting Commissioner of Food & Drugs of the FDA, the FDA has "evolved 
from an embryonic agency originally responsible for ensuring the 
safety of relatively few foods and drugs to an organization that 
regulates products worth $750 billion, or one-quarter of our 
nation's consumer expenditures." Benson, State of the Food and Drug 
Admin., 45 Food, Drug Cosmetic L. J. 301, 304 (1990). 
Congress has expressly vested the FDA with primary juris-
diction to determine whether a drug can be marketed and how much 
research is necessary before such marketing is approved. 21 C.F.R. 
§ 10.25(b). Accordf Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning. 
Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 627 (1973) (Congress granted the FDA primary 
jurisdiction because the FDA is its "expert agency," with expertise 
in resolving technical and scientific questions). To carry out 
these responsibilities, the FDA can be seen to wear many hats -
that of a regulatory agency; a law enforcement agency; a consumer 
protection agency, and a "science-based organization charged to 
protect and promote the public health." Benson at 304. 
Commissioner Benson states, that the FDA's principal job, however: 
is not simply to regulate products, but to minimize the 
medical risks and maximize the benefits associated with 
these products. This allows us to analyze each product-
24 
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based problem in public health terms and to build solu-
tions based on regulatory or nonregulatory actions, or 
an optimum mix of the two. 
Id. at 304. 
Indeed, the "FDA is unique in that its sole responsibility 
is to determine whether the benefits to be gained by releasing a 
new technology outweigh the risks inherent in innovation." 
1 OfReilly, The Food & Drug Admin. § 3.07 at 3-22 (1984) 
("O'Reilly11). In approving an NDA, the FDA balances the "expected 
therapeutic gains" against the "risks entailed by its use." United 
States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979). Its experts analyze 
all the testing, clinical, and anecdotal data and make the "tough 
choices about which risks are acceptable in order to obtain a drugfs 
benefits."15 The approval process applies "the highest standards 
for effectiveness and safety in the world."16 
15. O'Reilly, at §§ 14.04-14.05. §es. 21 U.S.C § 505(d); American 
Pharm. Assoc, v. Weinberger. 377 F. Supp. 824, 828-831 (D.D.C 
1974), aff'd, 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (FDA makes initial 
decision on drug safety and effectiveness based on all available 
medical and scientific data). 
16. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the Subcommittee on the 
Judiciary. 93rd Cong. 2d Sess., 616-18 (1974). "The average new 
drug application today contains 100,000 pages, filling hundreds of 
volumes. Applications arrive at FDA, literally, in truck loads." 
O'Reilly. § 13.11 at 13-57 n.6 (quoting former HHS Secretary 
Schweiker). The new drug approval process can require as much as 
ten years of testing and evaluation that includes: (1) preliminary 
evaluation of a pharmaceuticals chemical and therapeutic 
properties; (2) testing in animal models; (3) detailed protocols 
for testing in humans; (4) double-blind, placebo-controlled testing 
on several hundred persons and, if these tests provide assurances 
of the drugfs safety and effectiveness; (5) at least two long-term 
clinical trials involving large groups of patients to further assess 
safety, effectiveness and optimal dosage. See 47 Fed. Reg. 46622, 
et seg. (Oct. 19, 1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 26720, et sea. (June 9, 1983); 
21 U.S.C. § 301 efe seg. ? Schwartz, "Medical Costs and the Drug 
Industry11 Wall St. J. 26. (Apr. 21, 1980). 
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The FDA's risk-benefit evaluation does not stop with 
FDA approval of a drug for marketing. Detailed warnings of known 
risks and statements of efficacy are formulated by the FDA and 
required to be supplied to the prescribing physician in a carefully 
tailored "package insert.11 The FDA then continues to monitor drugs 
through an elaborate worldwide surveillance system that draws upon 
safety reports from clinical studies, epidemiological studies, and 
data published in medical literature.17 If the manufacturer with-
holds relevant information, tort liability can follow.18 
The FDA is well-situated to carry out its regulatory 
role, having over 8,000 employees. Depo. of Arthur Hull Hayes, 
Jr., M.D., Vol. I, at 139. Dr. Hayes was Commissioner of the FDA 
in 1982, the year the New Drug Application (,fNDAM) for Halcion 
was approved and is a witness in this case. Dr. Hayes testified 
that the FDA New Drug Review staff during the year prior to approval 
of Halcion consisted of approximately 77 physicians, 50 chemists, 
36 pharmacologists, and 40 Consumer Safety Officers. Id. at 342. 
Moreover, seven congressional subcommittees have "jurisdiction for 
conducting oversight of the FDA • • • including the labor committee 
in the Senate, including the House energy and commerce committee[s], 
both the committee on health and environment and oversight for the 
17. Postmarketing Surveillance of Prescription Drugs, Office of 
Technology Assessment, U.S. Cong., U.S. 6.P.O. (Nov. 1982); Lee & 
Turner, Food and Drug Administration's Adverse Drug Reaction 
Monitoring Program, 35 Am. J. Hosp. Pharm. 929 (1978) ; see, 21 
C.F.R. §314.1 (1984); 21 C.F.R. 310.300(a) (1984); 21 C.F.R. 
§§ 310.300(b), (b)(2) (1983). 
18. Collins v. Ortho Pharm. Corp.. 186 Cal. App. 3d 1194, 231 
Cal. Rptr. 396, 404 (1986); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell. Inc.. 
251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 702-05 (1967). 
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investigation committee." Depo. of Edward 0. Bixler, Ph.D., Vol. 
I, at 1-143, 1-144. The small business and government operations 
committees also engage in oversight. Id. 
The federal cases hold that, by allowing a drug to be 
marketed, the FDA has "determined that a legitimate public interest 
in its availability outweighs any adversities which might arise in 
the course of its usage. TA1 court is not in a position to second-
guess such a determination."19 
Neither should individual courts and juries in products 
liability cases play a role in determining whether a prescription 
drug should have been marketed. That decision is up to the FDA. 
An individual suit should be limited to whether the drug was prop-
erly labeled so that the physician could adequately evaluate its 
use in treatment of plaintiff. It should not be used to second-
guess the Congress and the FDA's policy decisions. Comment k should 
be applied to exempt all properly labeled and manufactured pre-
scription drugs from liability for design defect. 
III. THE BETTER REASONED CASES SUPPORT APPLICATION 
OF THE UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE PRODUCT EXCEPTION TO 
ALL PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 
A. All Jurisdictions Give Special Treatment 
To Prescription Drugs 
In light of the unique nature of prescription medications, 
their extensive regulation by the FDA, and the public policy concern 
that research and development of such drugs not be discouraged, 
19. Jacobs v. Dista Products Co.. 693 F. Supp. 1029, 1035 (D. Wyo. 
1988) (emphasis added). Accord, Hanson v. United States, 417 F. 
Supp. 30, 37 (D. Minn. 1976), aff'd. 540 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976) 
("The district courts have no role to play in determining whether 
a new drug should or should not be approved by the FDA.)11 
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courts and legislatures have exercised extreme caution to ensure 
that the expansion of product liability theories will not unduly 
deter the development and production of pharmaceuticals. 
For instance, nearly all courts, including those relied 
on by plaintiffs, have adopted Comments k and j to § 402A, and the 
negligence standard they embody, as applied to allegations of 
failure to warn about the alleged risks of prescription medica-
tions.20 "Public policy favors the development and marketing of 
new and more efficacious drugs. The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
recognizes this policy by rejecting strict liability in favor of 
negligence for drug related injuries, . . .n Payton v. Abbott Labs, 
386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171, 189-90 (1982). 
Similarly, in Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co.. 79 111. 2d 26, 
402 N.E.2d 194, 199-200 (1980), the Illinois Supreme Court stated: 
This court is acutely aware of the social desirabil-
ity of encouraging the research and development of bene-
ficial drugs. We are equally aware that risks, often 
grave, may accompany the introduction of these drugs 
into the marketplace. We simply think, however, in accor-
dance with Comments j and k of section 4 02A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, that where liability is 
framed by the manufacturers duty to warn adequately of 
dangers which may arise from the use of a drug, that 
20. See, e.g., Gaston v. Hunter. 588 P.2d 326, 341-342 (Ariz. 1978) 
(public policy favors new drug development, for there is always 
"the risk that needless human suffering and death will occur because 
a beneficial new drug is withheld from mankind too long11); Sheffield 
v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 144 Cal. App. 3d 583, 597 (1983) (held there 
is "a recognized public policy in encouraging swift production and 
marketing of new pharmaceutical products which prevent disease and 
save human life.)11 See also, Schmidt, The FDA Today: Critics, 
Congress and Consumerism, in The Drug Lag; Federal Government 
Decisionmaking 35 (R. Campbell ed. 1968); Wardell RX for Drug 
Regulation 25-28 (Sept.-Oct. 1979); Note, The Liability of Pharm. 
Mfrs. For Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 
735, 756-757 (when new drugs are delayed "the human cost . . . 
falls primarily on the incarcerated, the indigent and the ill"). 
28 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
liability should be based on there being some manner in 
which to know of the danger. 
For similar reasons, the vast majority of jurisdictions, 
including Utah, have adopted the "learned intermediary doctrine." 
As previously noted, even plaintiffs recognize that Utah applies 
that doctrine and that the pharmaceutical manufacturer's duty to 
warn is limited to warning the physician, not the patient. 
In Brown v. Superior Court. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 245 Cal. 
Rptr. 412, 751 P.2d 470, 476 (1988), the California Supreme Court 
agreed with the rationale of these and similar cases.21 It held 
that courts must strongly consider these important distinctions 
between prescription drugs and other products intended simply for 
pleasure or to make life easier. They must not lose sight of the 
fact that prescription drugs, unlike even other life-bettering 
medical products such as wheelchairs, necessarily entail some risks 
of perhaps serious harm. For this reason, "the broader public 
interest in the availability of drugs at an affordable price must 
be considered in deciding the appropriate standard of liability 
for injuries resulting from their use." 751 P.2d at 478-79. 
Brown concluded "[i]f drug manufacturers were subject 
to strict liability, they might be reluctant to undertake research 
programs to develop some pharmaceuticals that would prove beneficial 
or to distribute others that are available to be marketed, because 
of the fear of large adverse monetary judgments." Id. 
21. Accord, Collins v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 186 Cal. App. 
3d at 1203; Kearl v. Lederle Labs.. 172 Cal. App. 3d at 822-25; 
Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 144 Cal. App. 3d at 598-99. See, 
Comment, Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically 
Undiscoverable Defects. 71 Geo. L. Rev. 1635, 1648-1650 (1983). 
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These same policy concerns have led a multitude of legis-
latures to adopt special statutory restrictions on liability for 
prescription drugs. Utah lav provides a prime example of this 
practice. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-18-2(1) (Supp. 1990) states that 
"punitive damages may not be awarded if a drug causing the claim-
ant's harm: (a) received premarket approval or licensure by the 
Federal Food and Drug Administration . . ••' The Utah legislature 
has thus made an important policy decision designed to avoid dis-
couraging marketing of FDA-approved drugs. This policy applies 
even to drugs marketed with inadequate warnings. 
Many other states have enacted similar special rules 
recognizing the unique place of prescription drugs in our society. 
Thus, in addition to Utah, five other states provide a prescription 
drug exemption from punitive damages.22 New Jersey further provides 
a rebuttable presumption that an FDA-approved warning was adequate, 
see N.J. Stat. § 2A: 58C-4, and Maryland precludes even negligence 
liability on the part of a physician for proper use of FDA-approved 
drugs. Md. Ad. Legis. Serv. Ch. 546, § 18-401 (1990). 
The authorities relied on by plaintiffs justify their 
expansion of the basis of liability of pharmaceutical manufacturers 
by relying on the oft-repeated, but increasingly questionable,. 
justification that increasing the scope of a manufacturer's liabil-
ity will purportedly encourage it to make a safe product. To the 
contrary, there is no evidence that subjecting complex prescription 
22. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-701(A); N.J. Stat. § 2A:58C-5(c); 
Oh. Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.80(C); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.927; Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 13-64-302.5(5). < 
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drugs to repeated reevaluations by lay judges and juries will 
improve the safety of those drugs to any degree. 
On the other hand, there are good reasons to conclude 
that, in the area of prescription drugs, products liability law has 
gone far enough. While a drug manufacturer typically spends up to 
$85 million to develop and test a new drug23 and while each new 
product undergoes the most stringent regulatory scrutiny in the 
world, there still can be no guarantee of absolute safety. The 
Pharmacological Basis of Therapeutics. 59-60 (7th ed. 1985). As 
noted by the Tort Policy Working Group: 
The changing standards of liability and causation have 
generated tremendous uncertainty. The ,frules of the 
game" of tort liability have changed so dramatically and 
rapidly in recent years that fewer are willing to specu-
late on what those rules will be even a few years hence. 
Invariably, however, those rules seem to have changed to 
the prejudice of parties with pockets sufficiently deep 
to bear increasingly generous awards of compensation.24 
Increasingly, the response to this uncertainty over 
whether manufacturers will be subject to massive, uninsured 
liabilities has been removal of important, beneficial products 
from the market. This is not some tired song of manufacturers;25 
it is a stark reality. A 1990 Commerce Report industrial Outlook" 
23. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act: 
Hearing Before the Sen?t? C9T"^ > on Labor and Human Resources, 98th 
Cong. 2d Sees. 106 (1984). 
24. United States Department of Justice, Report of the Tort Policy 
Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the 
Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability 51 (Wash-
ington, D.C. Government Printing Office, Feb. 1986). 
25. While some people have suggested that some insurance companies 
have invented the "insurance crisis11 to justify increased rates, 
there can be no doubt that those rates have in fact increased 
dramatically and have forced many prescription drugs and other 
products as veil, off the market. 
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survey of U.S. industry concluded that current product liability 
policy creates competitive disadvantages for the U.S. 
pharmaceutical, vaccine, medical device, chemical and pesticide 
industries. Vol. 52, The Pink Sheet. April 9, 1990. A few examples 
of the results of this concern are noted below. These are just 
the tip of the iceberg. 
B. ynav^UgbiUtV Pf Vfrccjneg ?nd Qthey Pryqs 
DTP Vaccine. In the 1960's, there were as many as eight 
manufacturers of diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis (DTP) vaccine. 
In June 1984, Wyeth announced it would cease production of DTP 
vaccine, citing "higher insurance costs and the risk of liability 
and lawsuits from users of the vaccine, as well as the cost of 
defending any lawsuits." N.Y. Times, June 20, 1984, § D at 4, 
col. 6. This left only two manufacturers of the vaccine. Connaught 
Laboratories withdrew from the market soon thereafter, also citing < 
sharply higher liability insurance rates. The cost of the vaccine 
skyrocketed from 45 cents in 1982 to $11.40 per shot in 1986, and 
most of the increases went into a fund for lawsuits.26 < 
Spot shortages of DTP vaccine had already been reported 
by the Centers for Disease Control. Federal officials identified 
the "increasing number of lawsuits" as the major reason for the < 
shortage.27 In response to the unavailability of the vaccine, the 
Centers recommended that physicians postpone DTP booster shots and 
1 
26. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1984, § C at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 12, 1984, § A at 21, col. 1: The Product Liability Reform 
Act; Report of Senator Danforth, Committee on Commerce. Science, 
and Transportation. 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (Aug. 15, 1986). 
27. N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1984 § A at 19, col. 1. 
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defer giving DTP vaccine to children other than infants in order to 
conserve supplies. Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis Vaccine Shortage, 
253 J.A.M.A. 1540 (1985). 
The DTP shortage of 1984-1985 was a remarkable event, 
and one that must be considered when evaluating expanded theories 
advocated by plaintiffs. The worldfs most technologically advanced 
nation, with one of the most sophisticated systems of health care 
delivery, could not provide its citizens with a vaccine whose util-
ity and effectiveness had been established for 40 years. In part 
to prevent such shortages, Congress stepped in and created the 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986.28 
Polio Vaccine. The DTP crisis is only the most recent 
in a series of drug shortages directly related to manufacturers1 
inability to obtain insurance. In 1976, the Senate traced the 
unavailability of polio vaccine in twelve states to rulings expand-
ing the theories of liability in connection with mass vaccination 
programs. The Assistant Surgeon General testified manufacturer: 
liability for vaccine-associated disability, regularly 
assigned by courts, threatens a predictable vaccine supply 
— especially of oral polio vaccine — and diminishes 
the chances of significant independent manufacturer-spon-
sored research and development of new biologies.29 
28. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300aa-10, e£ sgg. (1986). 
29. Polio Immunization Program, 1976: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 120 (Sept. 23, 1976). The problem was partially 
solved when the Public Health Service agreed to assume 
responsibility for transmitting an elaborate warning to participants 
in immunization programs. However, a report has found that there 
remains only one maker of oral polio vaccine. Brody, "When Products 
Turn Into Liabilities" Litigation & Ins. 8-11 (Jul/Aug 1986). 
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Svine Flu Vaccine. Similarly, when the federal government 
began planning a mass program of public immunization against swine 
flu, pharmaceutical companies were afraid to produce the required 
vaccine because of concerns over potential liability and over the 
unavailability of insurance. Had the government not stepped in to 
provide immunity under the National Swine Flu Immunization Program 
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976), the vaccine 
would not have been produced. The next time, the government may 
not be willing or able to afford to provide such immunity.30 
Bendectin. This prescription morning sickness drug was 
used in an estimated 33 million pregnancies over 27 years. Despite 
40 epidemiological studies showing no increased incidence of birth 
defects, a flood of lawsuits was filed against the manufacturer. 
In 1983, the manufacturer's insurance premiums reached $10 million 
on sales of $12 to $13 million. In 1984, even after a federal 
jury found that Bendectin was not responsible for birth defects, 
the company abandoned production of the drug.31 
Oculinum. This experimental medicine was the only medi-
cine that provided satisfactory relief to thousands of patients 
with rare neuromuscular disorders which resulted in functional 
30. Remarks of Douglas A. Riggs, General Counsel of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce on the Causes of the Insurance and Product 
Liability Crisis 5 (June 26, 1986); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Rpt. of 
the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy 
Implications of the Current Crisis in Insur. Availability and 
Affordability 76-80 (Washington, D.C., Gov. P.O., Feb. 1986). 
31. Tamar Lewin, Pharmaceutical Companies Are the Hardest Hit, N.Y. 
Times, March 10, 1985 § 3 at 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, March 14, 1985 
§ A at 22, col.6. 
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blindness. In 1986# the supply of the medicine was cut off when 
its only manufacturer was unable to obtain liability insurance.32 
Vaccine for Japanese Encephalitis. In 1986, the manu-
facturer ceased distribution of this vaccine because it could not 
obtain "appropriate liability insurance, and there was no statutory 
mechanism for absolving it of liability."33 The vaccinefs unavail-
ability put Americans traveling to Asia at risk. 
The loss of beneficial products can occur without actually 
driving a particular manufacturer entirely out of business. It 
does not matter whether an important pharmaceutical therapy is 
lost because of a ruined producer or because the product was aban-
doned in favor of research less fraught with liability risks. In 
either case, the negative impact on the public health is the same. 
Contraceptive and Fertility Drugs. The adverse impact 
of expanded theories of liability has also been keenly felt by 
manufacturers of contraceptive drugs for women. The AMA has docu-
mented the dramatic drop in basic research: 
In the early 1970s, there were 13 pharmaceutical companies 
actively pursuing research on contraception and fertility. 
Now, only one U.S. company conducts contraceptive and 
fertility research. Unless the liability laws are dras-
tically altered, it is unlikely that pharmaceutical com-
panies will aggressively pursue research in this area.34 
32. N.Y. Times, October 14, 1986 § C at 1, col. 3. 
33. Marcus, Liability for Vaccine-Related Injuries, 318 N. Eng. J. 
Med. 191 (1988). 
34. A.M.A., Report of Board of Trustees, supra at 9; see also N.Y. 
Times, October 30, 1988, § 1 at 1, col. 1 (In 1970, "there were 20 
companies doing research on contraceptive development, including 
all family planning methods. Now all but one has gotten out of 
the business."). 
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Private domestic research expenditures on contraceptives declined 
by 90% in the decade following their peak in 1973, and "no truly 
new contraceptive chemical entities have been introduced since 
1968."35 Innovation also has virtually ceased with respect to 
fertility drugs due to liability concerns.36 
AIDS Research. The above examples are proof of the 
negative impact of expanded theories of liability on the development 
of new drugs. What lies ahead? Some forecast that the "general 
climate of uncertainty is something that deters many pharmaceutical 
companies from being involved in AIDS vaccine research."37 Commerce 
Department Secretary Mosbacher labelled such discouragement "a 
tragedy for this country," noting "product liability concern caused 
Genentech to cancel research into an AIDS vaccine [because] the 
potential liability for that product was so great."38 
Concern about these and similar examples of the effect 
of expansion of product liability rules on pharmaceutical research 
and development has been the impetus behind the decisions of Cali-
35. P. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 
(1988), at 155; see also Chicago Sun-Times, September 23, 1987, 
§ 2, at 37 (",Wetre basically going to hell as far as 
contraceptives and women's health is concerned.1"). 
36. P. Huber, J&j. at 155. 
37. Statement of Project Director the National Academy of Science 
Report, Confronting AIDS — Directions for Public Health. Health 
Care, and Research, 222 (1986), in Insurance Costs Deter AIDS 
Vaccine, Liab. & Ins. Bull. (BNA) No. 1, at 5 (November 3, 1986). 
38. Vol. 52 The Pink Sheet. April 9, 1990. Others suggest that 
this country may soon be in the ludicrous position of developing a 
vaccine for AIDS and not being able to find a manufacturer to 
produce it because of liability concerns. See Will AIDS Vaccine 
Bankrupt the Company that Makes It?. Science 1035 (Sept. 1986); 
Benefits. Risks, Vaccines and the Courts. Science (March 1985); 
Liability Nightmare. National Review 15 (Aug. 23, 1985). 
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fornia and other states to reject a case-by-case application of 
Comment k. These courts state that every Mdrug properly tested, 
labeled with appropriate warnings, approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration, and marketed properly under federal regulation is, 
as a matter of law, a reasonably safe product." Leibowitz v. Ortho 
Pharm. Corp.. 307 A.2d 449, 458 (Pa. 1973). 
C. The Better Reasoned Decisions Further The Special 
Policy In Favor Of Prescription Drugs By Applying 
Comment k To All Prescription Drugs 
The most important recent case to determine that Com-
ment k's "unavoidably unsafe product" exception should be applied 
to all prescription medications is Brown v. Superior Court. 751 
P.2d at 480-83. Brown expressly disapproved the conclusion of 
Kearl v. Lederle Labs.. 218 Cal. Rptr. at 464, that Comment k should 
be applied on a case-by-case basis. Kearl had suggested, at 464, 
that in each case an evidentiary "mini-trial" should be held out 
of the jury's hearing at which the court would decide whether the 
drug qualified for Comment k by considering; 
(1) whether, when distributed, the product was intended 
to confer an exceptionally important benefit that made 
its availability highly desirable; (2) whether the then-
existing risk posed by the product was both 'substantial1 
and 'unavoidable'; and (3) whether the interest in avail-
ability (again measured as of the time of distribution) 
outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced accountabil-
ity through strict liability design defect review. 
Brown found Kearl's case-by-case approach unworkable in 
practice and inadvisable as public policy. Under Kearl. whether 
a drug qualified for Comment k treatment would be a mixed question 
of fact and law, which each judge faced with a case concerning 
that drug would be forced to redetermine. This would mean 
"different trial judges might reach different conclusions as to 
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whether the same drug should be measured by strict liability 
principles . . . [and we] do not see how a reviewing court could 
harmonize these differing conclusions • . •" Brown. 751 P.2d at 
482. 
Brown further found that the factors used by a judge to 
decide whether a drug qualifies for Comment k treatment would over-
lap considerably with the factors a jury would use to decide design 
defect liability if Comment k were not applied, so that "the judge 
in effect makes a preliminary determination whether a drug contains 
a design defect." Id. If the judge decided Comment k did not 
aPPiy# a n d the jury decided that there was no design defect using 
similar standards, "there is a danger of inconsistency between 
the findings of the judge and the jury in the same case.'9 Id. 
Most importantly, Brown found Kearl's approach would 
discourage the development of new drugs, and so negate the principal 
purpose of applying Comment k in the first instance. Under Kearl. 
a "drug manufacturer has no assurance that a product he places on 
the market will be measured by the liability standard of comment k 
. . . " Brown. 751 P.2d at 481. Because every drug is subject to 
scrutiny to see if it "qualifies": 
[a] manufacturer's incentive to develop what it might 
consider a superior product would be diminished if it 
might be held strictly liable for harmful side effects 
because a trial court could decide, perhaps many years 
later, that in fact another product which was available 
on the market would have accomplished the same result. 
Id. at 482. Brown thus held the case-by-case determination cannot 
"be accomplished without substantially impairing the public interest 
in the development and marketing of new drugs, because the harm to 
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this interest arises in the very process of attempting to make the 
distinction." Id. at 481 (emphasis added). 
These serious policy concerns convinced the California 
Supreme Court that "In order to vindicate the public's interest 
in the availability and affordability of prescription drugs, a manu-
facturer must have a greater assurance that his products will not 
be measured by a strict liability standard than is provided by the 
test stated in Kearl." Brown. 751 P.2d at 482. Therefore: 
[I]n accord with almost all of our sister states39 that 
have considered the issue, we hold that a manufacturer 
is not strictly liable for injuries caused by a prescrip-
tion drug so long as the drug was properly prepared and 
accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities 
that were either known or reasonably scientifically know-
able at the time of distribution. 
39. Among the decisions with which Brown is in accord is Plummer 
v. Lederle Labs.. 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir.), cert, denied. 484 
U.S. 898 (1987) (citing the Brown intermediate appellate decision) 
(if drug manufacturers adequately warn, "they are not held to a 
strict liability standard for the consequences attending the use 
of the product, but to a negligence standard"); Fellows v. U.S.V. 
Pharmaceutical Corp.. 502 F. Supp. 297, 300 (D. Md. 1980) (a 
prescription drug manufacturer will not incur liability under § 402A 
"unless the manufacturer has failed to provide adequate warnings 
of the drug's possible dangers"); Stone v. Smith. Kline & French 
Labs. 447 So. 2d 1301, 1304 (Ala. 1984) ("in the case of an 
•unavoidably unsafe' yet properly prepared prescription drug, the 
adequacy of the accompanying warning determines whether the drug, 
as marketed, is defective or unreasonably dangerous"). Accord. 
Weinberger v. Bristol-Mvers Co.. 652 F. Supp. 187 (D. Md. 1986) ; 
Purvis v. PPG Indus.. Inc.. 502 So. 2d 714, 718 (Ala. 1987); Collins 
v. Qrtho Pharm. Corp.. 231 Cal. Rptr. at 400-405; Gaston v. Hunter. 
588 P.2d 326 (Ariz. App. 1978); McKee v. Moore. 648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 
1982); Kirk v. Michael Reese HOSP. & Med. Ctr. 117 111. 2d 507, 
513 N.E.2d 387, 392-94 (111. 1987), cert, denied. 485 U.S. 905 
(1988); McElhanev v. Eli Lilly & Co.. 575 F. Supp. 228 (D. S.D. 
1983), aff'd. 739 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1984); Lindsay v. Qrtho Pharm. 
Corp.. 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980); Chambers v. G.D. Searle & 
£0^, 441 F. Supp. 377, 380-81 (D. Md. 1975); aff'd. 567 F.2d 269 
(4th Cir. 1977); Leibowitz v. Qrtho Pharm. Corp.. 224 Pa. Super. 
418, 307 A.2d 449, 457-59 (1973) and Qrtho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman. 
180 Ind. App. 33, 388 N.E.2d 541, 544-53 (1979) (all stating 
prescription drug manufacturers are judged under a negligence standard). 
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Brown. 751 P.2d at 482-83. The California Supreme Court recently 
reaffirmed its "fear that strict product liability would frustrate 
pharmaceutical research" in Moore v. Regents of The Univ. of Calif.. 
51 Cal. 3d 120, 271 Cal. Rptr. 146, 793 P.2d 479 (1990). 
D. The Case-By-Case Approach Contravenes The Policies 
Behind Comment k And Does Not Provide Any Coherent 
Or Practical Guide For Its Application 
Plaintiffs would have the Court ignore the public policy 
rationales behind Brown and similar decisions, and authorize reexam-
ination of the marketing of a drug in every case. Upjohn respect-
fully suggests that this simply makes no sense, for in so doing a 
court would effectively be determining that the FDA erred in approv-
ing the drug in the first instance. As the above discussion 
teaches, this is clearly not a court or jury's role in a civil 
personal injury case such as this one. Moreover, uniform appli-
cation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 g£ seq., < 
would be seriously threatened. HJudicial interpretation of the 
effect of FDA approval by state courts which furthers this policy 
of interstate consistency is thus preferable to interpretation < 
which undermines this goal." Collins, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 404. 
1. The Cases Cited By Plaintiff Erroneously 
Believed That A Case-By-Case Approach Was 
Necessary To Protect The Public < 
The cases relied on by plaintiffs, which decided a case-
by-case analysis could and should be made, are simply wrongly 
decided. Counsel for Upjohn are familiar with the briefing in a 
number of these cases,40 and it is unfortunate that neither the 
40. These cases include Kociemba v. G.D. Searle S Co., 680 F. Supp. 
1293 (D. Minn.), fin reh'r, 695 F. Supp. 432 (D. Minn. 1988); and 
Pollard v. Ashby. 793 S.W.2d 394 (Mo. App. 1990), among others. 
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relevant policy issues, nor the practical effects of adoption of a 
case-by-case approach, were adequately raised to those courts. 
Whether this is the reason these courts reached their decisions is 
of course unknown, but it is instructive that only the Brown briefs 
fully discussed these issues. In any event, a review of plaintiffs1 
cases reveals that none fully considered the policy reasons against 
a case-by-case approach. Each instead focused on the same concern: 
that application of Comment k to all prescription drugs might permit 
an undeserving drug with "fractious" benefit to somehow get past 
the FDA and yet be immune from liability.41 This concern is not a 
valid one. The approach taken by Brown and the other cases cited 
leaves the public, and plaintiffs, well protected. 
First, as discussed above and as set out in detail in 
Tab A of the Appendix in regard to Halcion, the FDA undertakes a 
far more extensive and thorough review of a drugfs risks and bene-
fits to society than could ever be undertaken by an individual 
court or jury. The FDA can call on teams of scientists, researchers 
and physicians in reviewing each NDA; it can hold hearings; it can 
demand new tests and studies; it can add warnings or delete indica-
tions; it can consult Science Advisory Committees, and it can remove 
a drug from the market, either sua sponte or through a petition 
which could be filed with it by plaintiff or by any other person. 
The public is well protected by existing law. 
Furthermore, to the extent that risks are unknown after 
the many levels of expert risk-benefit analysis performed by the 
41. See, e.g., poUarfl Yt A^toY* 793 S.W.2d at 400; Toner v. 
Lederle Laboratories. 112 Idaho 328, 732 P.2d 297 (1987), cert. 
denied. 485 U.S. 942 (1988), and cases cited infra. pp. 43-45. 
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manufacturer, the FDA, the Congress, and the physician, having 
juries second-guess these risk-benefit decisions in hindsight will 
not enhance public safety. Neither courts nor juries should be able 
to disregard the considered decisions of administrative agencies 
which have expertise and are charged with responsibility to make 
informed decisions about these key social policy matters. 
Moreover, application of Comment k simply prohibits design 
defect liability for prescription drugs. It in no way inhibits 
imposition of liability for negligently marketed medications without 
adequate labeling. The application of Comment k simply means that 
needed medications, the dangers of which cannot be avoided, will 
be permitted to remain on the market without imposition of liabil-
ity, if, but only if. (1) adequate warnings are given in light of 
what defendant knew or should have known, and (2) FDA approval is 
received based on adequate information. 
It must also be remembered that the standard which a 
prescription drug manufacturer must meet under Utah law and that of 
other jurisdictions to show adequacy of warning under a negligence ( 
theory is extremely high. Utah holds that: 
In determining whether a manufacturer has breached 
that duty [to adequately warn] and the extent to which a 
manufacturer is required to know of dangers inherent in { 
its drug, it is important to point out that the drug 
manufacturer is held to be an expert in its particular 
field and is under a Continuous duty . . . to keep 
abreast of scientific developments touching upon the 
manufacturers product and to notify the medical profes-
sion of any additional side effects discovered from its ( 
use.1 Tfre flrug manufacturer is responsible therefore 
for not only 'actual knowledge gained from research and 
adverse reaction reports,1 but also for Constructive 
knowledge ?s measured fey ggjentifjg literature and other 
available means of communication. 
Barson, 682 P.2d at 835-36 (emphasis added). 
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2. The Case-By-Case Approach Is Inconsistently 
Applied and Offers No Greater Public Protection 
Than Does Application of Comment k to All Pre-
scription Drugs. 
Even were the reasons for concern with the application 
of Comment k to all prescription drugs valid, the case-by-case 
approach does not provide a desirable way to resolve that concern. 
As just noted, even if Comment k applies, the manufacturer 
is held to the skill of an expert and is liable for any negligence 
in warning. To this plaintiffs wish to add the uncertainty - the 
"Russian Roullette" - of the case-by-case approach. As Brown states 
so well, however, such uncertainty will discourage the development 
of new drugs because the manufacturer will have no way of knowing 
by what standard his drug will be judged. Indeed, the manufacturer 
cannot even predict what case-by-case test may be applied, further 
undermining both its ability to develop a drug which will meet 
this test, and its willingness to even attempt to market a new 
drug in the face of such an uncertain standard for liability. 
For instance, Kearl v. Lederle Labs, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 
463, as well as other decisions such as Johnson v. American 
Cvanamid Co., 239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318 (1986), hold that whether 
Comment k will apply to a drug is a mixed question of law and fact 
for determination by the Court outside the presence of the jury. 
On the other hand, Castrianano v. E.R. Souibb & Sons. Inc.. 546 
A.2d 775, 782 (R.I. 1988), would leave the issue to the court in 
the cases of drugs clearly deserving protection, but would submit 
it to the jury in close cases. Pollard v. Ashby. 793 S.W.2d 394 
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(Mo. App. 1990), would seem to follow the converse approach.42 
Finally, one or two authorities have suggested that the issue is 
one of fact for the jury. Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 
410, 416 (Colo. 1986); S. Willig, The Comment K Character: A 
Conceptual Barrier to Strict Liability. 29 Mercer L. Rev. 545, 579 
(1978). 
As thoroughly discussed above, Upjohn believes the Com* 
ment k decision is a policy one to be made by the legislature and 
the FDA, and not by the judiciary. If the issue is to be decided 
in the courts, however, it should be decided by the judge, not by 
the jury, for it is a policy issue, to be determined following a 
"hearing" as to relevant facts and social policies. In any event, 
the lack of agreement as to who should decide this issue is a strong 
indication that the case-by-case approach is not well thought out 
or capable of consistent application. Absent such consistency, 
where is the deterrence or other public benefit found? 
Even if it were agreed who would decide the Comment k 
issue, courts have reached varying determinations as to what test 
that reviewer will apply. Kearl sets forth the test as follows: 
(1) the product was intended to provide an exceptionally 
important benefit that made its availability highly 
desirable, (2) the risk posed by the product was substan-
tial and unavoidable when distributed, and (3) the 
interest in availability, measured as of the time of 
distribution, outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced 
42. Although Pollard officially declined to reach who should 
decide the Comment k issue in a case in which defendant failed to 
raise Comment k until the jury was instructed, it did state that 
in close cases "the trial court should strongly consider the public 
interest of increased protection for drug manufacturers." 793 
S.W.2d at 400, n.8 (emphasis added). Thus, perhaps unintentionally, 
the court indicated its belief that the issue is for the court as 
a policy matter at least in close cases. 
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accountability, the product will be deemed unavoidably 
dangerous and exempted from strict products liability 
design defect analysis. 
218 Cal. Rptr. at 464. In determining the "unavoidability" of 
risk, Kearl states the court will consider whether the product 
minimized known risks and whether available alternative products 
would have "as effectively accomplished the full intended purpose 
of the subject product." Id. (emphasis in original). 
Toper v l*tert$ Lafrff directly identifies two basic fac-
tors: whether (1) the risk is unavoidable in that the product 
could not have then been made more safely and there was then "no 
feasible alternative design which on balance accomplishes the sub-
ject productfs purpose with a lesser risk," 732 P.2d at 306; and 
(2) the drugfs benefits which "clearly appear at the time of dis-
tribution to outweigh their concomitant risks." Id. at 308. 
Hill v. Searle Labs. 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989), 
determined that "exceptional social need" for the product must 
also be shown. Castrianano v. Abbott Labs, by contrast, simply 
states that "the apparent benefits of the drug must exceed the 
apparent risks" to preclude design defect liability. 546 A.2d at 
781. Other decisions offer even less guidance as to how to decide 
the issue, figg, ?Tqt/ Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co.. 695 F. Supp. 
432 (D. Minn. 1988) (equating test with negligence inquiry). 
The differences in these approaches may not have seemed 
important to the courts adopting them, but they are very important 
to drug manufacturers. Proof that Halcio^s "apparent benefits 
exceed its apparent risks" would require extensive evidence support-
ing Halcionfs efficacy and safety. Proof of "exceptional social 
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need", on the other hand, might also require discussion of Halcionfs 
role in our society. Whether Halcion will "qualify" under that 
test might vary with changing public opinions toward medicines in 
general, and toward benzodiazepines in particular. It might also 
vary depending upon whether one has had a need for the product. A 
sleeping aid may seem unimportant to some, but vital to insomniacs; 
a pain reliever simply a minor benefit to some, but a life-saver 
to persons with migraine headaches. 
Equally unclear is how a court could compare Halcion or 
any other complex drug with its competitorsf products to determine 
if the latter would as effectively accomplish the drug's intended 
purpose (as Kearl requires)• This comparison will often be like 
the ill-fated attempt to compare "apples and oranges." The com-
parison simply cannot be made on any rational or consistent basis. 
For instance, in this case no discovery has been had of Up John's < 
competitors' regarding their benzodiazepine drugs. The jury will 
have neither the information contained in its competitors' files 
nor in the files of the FDA regarding competitors' drugs. How can < 
a lay factfinder make the kind of comparisons that the FDA has al-
ready made when it has none of the critical information necessary? 
Furthermore, a lay factfinder is not equipped to make < 
the same kind of risk-benefit analysis made by the FDA. The FDA 
is not constrained by rules of evidence. It can form task forces 
and Advisory Committees and conduct hearings and on-site inspec- < 
tions. It can demand that certain studies be made; it can consult 
with its self-chosen experts; it can examine hearsay evidence. 
The courts can do none of these things. < 
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As is apparent, no consistency can be anticipated as 
different courts or juries in different jurisdictions apply even 
the same test, much less the different ones noted above. Each 
test adopted by courts using the case-by-case approach is consistent 
in one regard, however: its disregard of the importance of the 
fact that prescription medications are marketed only £ffi physicians, 
and only for use by them in light of the warnings and indications 
set forth in the drug's labeling. 
Neither the FDA nor physicians would even begin to eval-
uate the societal benefit of a drug without considering what warn-
ings its label contained. For instance, consider the case of a 
product which is generally safe for use by most persons at reason-
able doses for reasonable periods, but which may pose somewhat 
more risk if given to the elderly, or if used for more than a cer-
tain period of days or at an elevated dosage. Are these matters 
appropriate only for consideration in drawing up warnings and indi-
cations for use so that the physician can determine when the drug 
might or might not be useful? Or are they not also matters which 
should be considered in evaluating the productfs design? A case-
by-case approach simply provides no adequate guidance as to how 
and when such warnings are to be considered. 
E. The Case-By-Case Approach Simply Cannot Be Imple-
mented As A Practical Matter In The Case Of Complex 
Drugs Such As Halcion 
The problems discussed in the preceding sections in them-
selves provide a sufficient basis to reject a case-by-case applica-
tion of Comment k. Equally important, due perhaps to gaps in brief-
ing, the courts cited by plaintiffs simply failed to consider the 
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practical impossibility of actually undertaking a risk-benefit 
analysis of the ••design" of a prescription drug. 
Indeed, ££££l's labeling of the Comment k determination 
as a "mini-trial11 was particularly inapt- A brief hearing may 
have appeared feasible for the oral polio vaccine in Kearl, but it 
is quite impractical when considering complex products such as 
Halcion. A hearing on the "design" of Halcion would be not a mini-
trial but a maxi-trial. and a procedural nightmare. 
The magnitude of the factual inquiry cannot be understood 
in a vacuum. This Court should be aware of the basic facts of 
Halcion*s development and approval for marketing. That evidence, 
a summary of which is included in Tab A of the Appendix,43 shows 
that Upjohn began testing Halcion in animals in the late 1960's, 
more than twelve years before it was first marketed in the United 
States. In 1970 Upjohn filed an IND permitting testing of Halcion 
on humans. After six years of research, Upjohn filed an NDA for 
Halcion in 1976. There followed six more years of research, exten-
sive testing by independent researchers, and detailed, page-by-
page analysis of the NDA by tens of FDA scientists. An Advisory 
Committee of outside experts also reviewed the evidence supporting 
Halcion. Only in 1982, after submission of up to 150 volumes of 
data covering numerous clinical trials on over 5,000 human subjects, 
was Halcion approved for marketing. 
43. This summary is based on public documents and the record in 
this case. It is offered because this Court cannot fairly be asked 
to make the important policy decisions raised by this certification 
without some context about the extensive approval process involved 
with an FDA-approved drug. 
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Moreover, since 1982# 50 to 100 additional volumes of 
data have been submitted and many additional human subjects have 
been studied in clinical trials. The FDA and an Advisory Committee 
of independent scientists have thoroughly reviewed Halcion and 
again determined it may be marketed with appropriate labeling. 
It would simply be impossible, as a practical matter, 
for a court or jury to fairly or accurately reanalyze the kind and 
magnitude of data considered by the FDA. Moreover, it is absolutely 
appropriate for a Court to consider such procedural and practical 
obstacles to a case-by-case application of Comment k, for an imprac-
tical or infeasible policy will not redound to the benefit of either 
plaintiffs or society. 
This point was well made recently in Smith v. Eli Lilly 
& Co,. 137 111. 2d 222, 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990), a prescription drug 
case concerning whether Illinois should adopt some form of "market 
share liability." In rejecting this novel theory, Smith reviewed 
"the experience of trial courts in California which earlier had been 
instructed to apply the market share theory," Id. at 337-38, 
stating: 
The trial judge in Los Angeles expressed exasperation 
with the task of attempting to formulate market shares 
after spending over four weeks examining the DES market 
. . . The judge then went on to criticize those who 
developed the market share theory because of their obvious 
lack of trial experience or knowledge as to what would 
go into proving a case based on the theory. 
Similarly, here, even were the case-by-case approach 
adopted by some other courts theoretically justified (and it is 
not), and even if courts could agree on a consistent test to be 
applied (and they do not), such an approach is simply not a 
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practical undertaking. The resulting factual/legal inquiries will 
not be mini-trials, but "maxi-trial" headaches. They would serve 
only to prejudice the jury or court, and to cause delay and expense 
as days or weeks of technical reanalysis of the FDA's approval 
process was undertaken. For this practical reason, as well as for 
the policy reasons previously identified, Comment k should apply 
to all prescription drugs. 
For the reasons stated herein Petitioner The Upjohn Com-
pany respectfully requests this Court to answer the questions certi-
fied to it by stating that (1) Utah adopts Comment k to Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 402A; (2) Utah applies Comment k and the prin-
ciples it embodies to all FDA-approved prescription drugs for impor-
tant reasons of public policy, and (3) there is no need to reach 
subquestions B and C. If such questions were reached, however, 
Upjohn suggests that a court rather than a jury should determine 
the Comment k issue, based on evidence about risks at issue in 
this case (not hypothetical risks) and the benefits the drug offers. 
Dated this 5th day of February, 1991. 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION 
ILO MARIE GRUNDBERG, individually, 
and JANICE GRAY, as personal 
representative of the Estate 
of Mildred Lucille Coats, 
Deceased, -CERTIFICATION ORDER 
TO UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Plaintiffs, 
U.S. District Court 
vs. Civil No. 89-C-274G 
THE UPJOHN COMPANY, a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this court acting sua sponte requests the Honorable 
Supreme Court of Utah to answer the question of law certified 
herein. As more particularly set forth below, the question 
certified is a controlling question of law in the above entitled 
case, and moreover, it involves a significant public policy 
issue. The United States District Court which is certifying this 
question has diversity of citizenship jurisdiction over this 
case, and the law of the State of Utah is the law to be applied. 
The courts of the State of Utah, including the Utah Supreme 
Court, have not previously addressed this question. It is 
believed that the question certified will not unduly interfere 
with the Utah Supreme Court's regular functioning or be 
inconsistent with the timely and orderly development of the 
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decisional lav of the State. In accordance with the said Rule 
41, the following matters are set forth as part of this 
Certification Order. 
1. The question of lav to be answered: Whether Utah 
adopts the "unavoidably unsafe products99 exception to strict 
products liability as set forth in Comment k to Section 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965)?1 
1
 Comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts provides: 
Comment k. Unavoidably unsafe products. 
There are some products which, in the present 
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable 
of being made safe for their intended and 
ordinary use. ' These are especially common in 
the field of drugs. An outstanding example 
is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of 
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very 
serious and damaging consequences when it is 
injected. Since the disease itself 
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both 
the marketing and the use of the vaccine are 
fully justified, notwithstanding the 
unavoidable high degree of risk which they 
involve. Such a product, properly prepared, 
and accompanied by proper directions and 
warning, is not defective, nor is it 
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of 
many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, 
many of which for this very reason cannot 
legally be sold except to physicians, or 
under the prescription of a physician. It is 
also true in particular of many new or 
experimental drugs as to which, because of 
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient 
medical experience, there can be no assurance 
of safety, or perhaps even of purity of 
ingredients, but such experience as there is 
justifies the marketing and use of the drug 
notwithstanding a medically recognizable 
risk. The seller of such products, again 
with the qualification that they are properly 
2 
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Subquestion A; If Utah does adopt Comment k, 
should FDA approved prescription drugs be deemed as a matter of 
lav to have satisfied the "unavoidably unsafe" prerequisite to 
the Comment k exception, or should that determination be made on 
a case by case basis? 
Subquestion B: If Utah does adopt Comment k, and 
if it is further determined that its application to FDA approved 
prescription drugs ought to be made on a case by case basis, is 
such determination a threshold question for the trial court, or a 
question properly to be presented to the jury? 
Subquestion C; If it is determined that Comment k 
is to be applied to FDA approved prescription drugs on a case by 
case basis, is evidence pertaining to adverse side-effects from 
the drug which were are not alleged to have been personally 
suffered by the plaintiff relevant to the "unavoidably unsafe" 
determination? 
2. The queptipn certified j? ? controlling jsgue pf 
law jn a case pepdjpg frefpr? th? certifying gpurti th? Vr\i%$$ 
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is 
given, where the situation calls for it, is 
not to be held to strict liability for 
unfortunate consequences attending their use, 
merely because he has undertaken to supply 
the public with an apparently useful and 
desirable product, attended with a known but 
apparently reasonable risk. 
3 
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States District Court for the District of Utah, entitled, 
Grundbero v. UpJohn Co,. Civil No. 89-C-274 (assigned to Hon. J, 
Thomas Greene). The question certified arises in the context of 
a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by defendant Upjohn that 
has been fully briefed and argued and is currently under 
advisement by the certifying court. Attached as Exhibit A to 
this Certification Order is the Memorandum Decision and Order of 
the certifying court which addresses related Motions for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
3. There ?pp?ars tp be np controlling Vtah Ipw. 
Utah adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts in Hahn v, Armco Steel Co,. 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 
1979) • However, Comment k to Section 402A has never been 
addressed by the Utah Supreme Court, in the context of 
prescription drugs or otherwise. 
In payspn vy E-?. Squibl? f gpngi Ing»# 682 P.2d 832 
(Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court considered a drug product 
liability case, but the court found that it vas not necessary to 
reach the strict liability issue because the court found that 
there vas sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on 
the -negligence claim. Id* at 837. Also, certain Utah statues 
address the liability of product and drug manufacturers, but 
these statutes do not directly address these Comment k issues. 
See Utah Code Ann. iS 78-15-6(3)(1987) (rebuttable presumption 
that product vas not defective if manufactured according to 
4 
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industry standards); 78-18-2 (1990 Supp.) (punitive damages 
unavailable if drug was approved by FDA). 
in p m e n Vt Leterle Laboratories* 676 F.supp. 233 (D. 
Utah 1987), a case involving a DPT vaccine, the certifying court 
predicted that the Utah Supreme Court likely would adopt Comment 
k if given the opportunity, and accordingly held that Comment k 
is the lav of Utah to be applied. Ifl. at 235. The court in 
Patten specifically rejected the position that defendant Upjohn 
urges here, and held that the "unavoidably unsafe9' element to 
Comment k immunity from strict liability for prescription drugs 
should be determined on a case by case basis. 
The "unavoidably unsafe" element of Comment k is that 
the product in question is made in the safest possible manner and 
that its benefits outweigh its inherent risks. In its pending 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Upjohn does not argue that 
factual disputes exist with regard to the unavoidably unsafe 
requirement; rather, Upjohn takes the position that Halcion, like 
all prescription drugs, satisfies this Comment k prerequisite as 
a matter of law. 
Defendant Upjohn argues that the court's holding in 
Patten ought to be reconsidered in light of the California 
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Superior Court. 751 P.2d 470 
(Cal. 1988), which held that for reasons of public policy, all 
FDA approved prescription drugs satisfy the Comment k unavoidably 
unsafe requirement as a natter of law. Plaintiffs, on the other 
5 
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hand, urge that the Patten decision is still in accord with the 
better position; Lt±., that a case by case determination should 
be aade regarding the unavoidably unsafe Comment k requirement. 
Both parties agree that the other prerequisite for the 
Comment k defense, that the drug "was properly prepared and 
accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities," must be 
established by the drug manufacturer in each case. 
3. States
 Bre divided p n ^ a question certified. 
States are divided on the question of whether 
prescription drugs should be deemed to be "unavoidably unsafe" as 
a matter, of law or whether this determination should be made on a 
case by case basis (subquestion A certified). See generally. 
Annotation, Products Liability; What is an "Unavoidably Unsafe" 
Product. 70 A.L.R.4th 16, 41-47 (1989 4 Supp. 1990). Courts 
supporting the view that all FDA approved prescription drugs are 
"unavoidably unsafe" as a matter of law include: Lindsav V. Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp.. 637 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying 
New York law); McElhanev v. Eli Lilly t Co.. 575 F.Supp. 228 (D. 
S.D. 1983), AlllA, 739 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1984)? Fellows v. USV 
Pharmaceutical Corp.. 502 F.Supp. 297 (D. Hd. 1980); Brown v. 
Superior Court. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Kirk v. Michael Reese 
HQSP. t Med. Ctr.. 513 N.E,2d 387, 392-94 (111. 1987); McKee v. 
K22££, 648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. 
CJttpjiaii, 388 N.E.2d 541, 544-53 (Ind. App. 1979); T^hovitz v. 
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 307 A.2d 449, 457-59 (Pa. Super. 
6 
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1973). 
Courts following the view that the Comment k 
"unavoidably unsafe" requirement should be made on a case by case 
basis with regard to prescription drugs include: Graham v. Wveth 
Laboratories. 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'o. 666 F.Supp. 
1483 (D. Kan. 1987) (applying Xansas law); Hill v. Searle 
Laboratories. 884 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying Arkansas 
law); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.. 642 F.2d 652 (1st 
Cir. 1981)(applying New Hampshire law); Allen v. G.D. Searle & 
££., 708 F.Supp. 1142 (D. Or. 1989); Kpcjembft yt Gtpt Searle t 
£2., 680 F.Supp. 1293, modified. 695 F.Supp. 432 (0. Minn. 1988); 
Topey vt Lederje LabpratPfjes, 732 p.2d 297 (Idaho 1987); Felflman 
V, Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984); yhltf y, Wyeth 
Laboratories. Inc.. 533 N.E.2d 748 (Ohio 1988); Castrinanano v. 
E.R. Souibb & Sons. Inc.. 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988); Gaston v. 
Hunter. 588 P.2d 326, 340 (Ariz. App. 1978). £e_e. also Note, A. 
Prescription for Applying Strict Liability; Not all Druos Deserve 
Comment K Immunization. 21 Ariz. St. L.J. 809 (1989). 
There is also an apparent split of authority as to 
whether the Comment k defense is a court or jury question 
(subquestion B certified). See id.. 21 Ariz. St. L.J. at 819-20. 
4. Facts relevant to the determination of the Question 
certified; 
Plaintiff Ilo Grundberg is the daughter of Mildred 
Lucille Coats, who died at age 83, after being shot by plaintiff 
7 
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on June 19, 1988. The other plaintiff, Janice Gray, is the 
personal representative of Ms. Coats* estate. Plaintiffs allege 
in their Complaint that Ms. Grundberg shot her mother as a direct 
and proximate result of her ingestion of the drug Halcion, vhich 
is a prescription drug manufactured by defendant UpJohn. Halcion 
is used for the treatment of insomnia, characterized by 
difficulty in falling asleep, frequent nocturnal awakenings, 
and/or early morning awakenings. Halcion is the common or trade 
name of the drug "triazolam91 (generic name). 
Triazolam was initially introduced into the world * 
market in Belgium in 1977. On May 4, 1976, Upjohn submitted a 
new drug application to the United States Food and Drug 
Administration ("FDA11) to market triazolam (Halcion) in the 
United States. The FDA approved Upjohn9s Halcion application on 
November 15, 1982. Since that time, defendant Upjohn has 
manufactured and distributed Halcion to pharmacies, hospitals and 
physicians for dispensation by prescription only. Zn 1988 
Halcion was distributed by Upjohn in the State of Utah and 
throughout the United States, and in more than 70 other nations 
around the world. 
Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Grundberg took a .5 
milligram dose of Halcion on the day that she shot her mother, 
and that this dosage was recommended by her physician and was 
consistent with UpJohn*s recommended dosage. Plaintiffs allege 
that Ms. Grundberg shot her mother while in a state of Halcion 
8 
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(triazolam)-induced intoxication, which allegedly included many 
side effects, such as depression, psychosis, depersonalization, 
aggressive assaultive behavior and homicidal compulsion. 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint states several causes of action, 
including Common Law Negligence (Count I), and Strict Liability 
(Count II).2 In connection with these claims, plaintiffs allege 
that defendant Upjohn knew or should have known that Halcion 
caused the adverse side effects that were allegedly suffered by 
plaintiff Grundberg. Plaintiffs further allege that Upjohn "did 
not adequately design, synthesize, test, manufacture, and inspect 
the Drug Halcion (triazolam),3 and willfully, recklessly, and/or 
negligently failed or refused to give adequate instructions, 
warnings and advice91 regarding such side effects to plaintiff 
Grundbergfs physician.4 Complaint Jf B.VIII, D.I., E.V. 
2
 Plaintiffs' other legal causes of action are set forth in Count III, Breach of Expressed 
and Implied Warranties (dismissed), and Count V, Wrongful Death. Counts IV, VI and VII are 
damage claims. 
3
 At oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs clarified that plaintiffs only claim that 
Halcion was defectively designed by Upjohn. Plaintiffs do not claim that a •manufacturing 
defect" occurred, Le., that plaintiff Grundberg ingested a "bad batch" of Halcion or that 
somehow a harmful ingredient was inadvertently made part of the specific Halcion pills that 
were taken by plaintiff Grundberg. Accordingly, allegations or references in the Complaint to 
manufacturing defects, as opposed to design defect claims, should be considered stricken from 
plaintiffs* Complaint 
Plaintiffs also alleged that Upjohn failed to give adequate warnings about Halcion to 
plaintiff Grundberg, plaintiff Gnmdberg's family, the public at large, hospitals and Pharmacists. 
However, in connection with a prior motion for partial summary judgment filed by defendant, 
the court dismissed all of plaintiffs* failure to warn claims except as they pertain' to plaintiff 
9 
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Plaintiffs also allege that the dosage of Halcion recommended by 
Upjohn and consumed by plaintiff Grundberg was excessive and 
dangerous and was the proximate cause of the death of plaintiff 
Grundberg*s mother, Mildred Lucille Coats. 
5. Additional Reasons for Acceptance of this 
Certification Order: The question and subquestions presented are 
of major importance in products liability actions against drug 
manufacturers. The issues presented are matters of first 
impression to the Utah Supreme Court and they are likely to recur 
repeatedly in federal courts applying Utah lav and in state court 
proceedings also. In terms of comity, this court believes that 
the Supreme Court of Utah should be given the opportunity to 
decide this matter of Utah lav rather than having this court 
address the matter in this diversity of citizenship case and 
render an "Eirie guess." 
A six week jury trial in this case is scheduled to 
commence on April 29, 1991. 
The necessary briefing relative to this matter has 
already been done by counsel, and it is believed that counsel for 
the parties vould be in a position to stipulate to an accelerated 
briefing schedule and presentation of arguments before the court. 
Grundberg's physician. £ee Order of March 11,1990f issued by Honorable Judge David K. 
Winder who was previously assigned to this case. This ruling was an application of the "learned 
intermediary doctrine* under Utah law. geg Barson v. E.R. Souibb & Sons. Inc.. 682 P.2d 832, 
835 (Utah 1984). 
10 
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This court respectfully requests, if the Honorable 
Supreme of Utah exercises its discretion to accept the question 
herewith certified, that the court set forth in its order of 
acceptance an expedited schedule for the filing of briefs and for 
oral argument as contemplated in Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
DATED: December l°f , 1990. 
THOMAS GREENE 
IITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
11 
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